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ELECTION LAW EXCEPTIONALISM?
A BIRD'S EYE VIEW OF THE SYMPOSIUM
HEATHER K. GERKEN*
The contributions to this symposium, sponsored by the Association of
American Law Schools ("AALS") Section on Federal Courts, offer interesting
and cogent analyses of three very different questions arising from the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence. Louise Weinberg adds to the growing body of literature
devoted to Bush v. Gore1 by proposing a new reason to question the decision-
the Court's short-circuiting of the democratic process, which Weinberg argues
implicates a special set of constitutional concerns. 2 Pamela Karlan examines
the difficulties the Supreme Court has encountered in implementing the Shaw
doctrine, which prohibits racial gerrymanders, and sketches out potential exit
strategies for the Court to remove itself from this thorny part of the political
thicket.3 And Avi Soifer offers a general critique of the Supreme Court's
recent jurisprudence, with an eye to showing that Bush v. Gore is little
different from the other Supreme Court decisions handed down this Term.
4
One theme unites these diverse contributions to the scholarly literature.
Each piece directly or indirectly raises the question of election law
exceptionalism 5-that is, whether constitutional law should be applied
* Heather K. Gerken, Assistant Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Many thanks to
Larry Yackle and the Association of American Law Schools ("AALS") Section on Federal
Courts for inviting me to take part in the interesting discussion that took place at the AALS
Annual Meeting in January of this year.
1 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
2 Louise Weinberg, When Courts Decide Elections: The Constitutionality of Bush v.
Gore, 82 B.U. L. REV. 609, 621 (2002).
3 Pamela S. Karlan, Exit Strategies in Constitutional Law: Lessons for Getting the Least
Dangerous Branch Out of the Political Thicket, 82 B.U. L. REV. 667, 673-74 (2002).
4 Aviam Soifer, Courting Anarchy, 82 B.U. L. REV. 699, 700-01 (2002).
1 This phrase mimics the phrase "electoral exceptionalism" used by Frederick Schauer
and Richard Pildes. See Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism
and the First Amendment, 77 TEx. L. REV. 1803, 1805 (1999). There is currently a debate
about whether we should label the study of the political process "election law" or the "law
of democracy." Compare Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Not by "Election Law"
Alone, 32 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1173, 1182-83 (1999) (asserting that the latter focuses the
inquiry on democracy itself and better reflects the field's ultimate "concern ... with the
structural aspects of constitutional law"), with Richard L. Hasen, Election Law at Puberty:
Optimism and Words of Caution, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1095, 1096 (1999) (using the phrase
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wholesale to democracy cases, or whether election law should be understood
as a special area of the law requiring its own, unique set of legal paradigms.
6
Here I briefly address how this question relates to the papers in this
symposium.
Election law has gotten a lot of attention lately. Even before the 2000
election transfixed the nation, election law had enjoyed increasing prominence
as a newly emerging legal discipline. In a recent symposium in the Loyola
Law Review entitled Election Law as Its Own Field of Study,7 Richard Hasen
remarked that no one now "can seriously question whether election law is a
subject in its own right, related to but apart from its very different parents,
constitutional law and political science."8 Two casebooks are now in their
second editions, an active internet discussion group has attracted hundreds of
subscribers, and the number of articles and symposia on election law topics has
increased exponentially since 1990.9 A number of scholars have made a name
writing about election law, and it has attracted the attention of prominent
public and private law scholars outside the field.
Moreover, the law of democracy has become an increasingly prominent part
of the Supreme Court's docket, as the Court engages in what Richard Pildes
has termed "the constitutionalization of democracy."' 0 Pildes explains that
although "constitutional law has regulated certain aspects of democratic
politics" since 1962, when the Supreme Court first ventured into the political
thicket in Baker v. Carr," "over the last decade or so... the Court now
routinely deploys constitutional law to circumscribe the forms democracy can
"election law" while noting the "remarkable degree of diversity" of scholarly opinion with
respect to the field's proper name). I use the terms interchangeably and chose the term
"election law" for the title only because, like all academics, I cannot resist the temptation for
cheesy alliteration.
6 One of the contributors to this symposium, Pam Karlan, has expressed serious doubts
about what she terms the "transsubstantive approach," but has concluded that she "lost that
battle" because "[t]he Court seems to have embraced the idea that ... there is one equal
protection clause." Pamela Karlan, Easing the Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative
Action After the Redistributing Cases 9 (Stanford Public Law and Legal Theory Working
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 24, 2001), available at http://papers.ssm.com/
abstract=282570.
7 Symposium, Election Law as Its Own Field of Study, 32 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1095
(1999).
8 Hasen, supra note 5, at 1095.
9 Id. at 1096 & n.5; see also ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (Daniel Hays
Lowenstein & Richard L. Hasen eds., 2001); THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY (Samuel Issacharoff
et al. eds., 2001).
1o Richard H. Pildes, Constitutionalizing Democratic Politics, in A BADLY FLAWED
ELECTION (Ronald Dworkin ed., forthcoming 2002); see also Karlan, supra note 3, at 671-
72; Daniel H. Lowenstein, Election Law as a Subject-A Subjective Account, 32 LoY. L.A.
L. REV. 1199, 1201 (1999).
1 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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take in situations that bear no relationship at all to those that had originally
justified constitutional intervention."
' 12
The contributions to this symposium all touch upon this question: is there
something special and distinct about the law of democracy, or is it best
understood as applied constitutional law? To borrow Pam Karlan's phrase, if
election law "is becoming a field in its own right ... [and] leaving
constitutional law's empire,"' 3 is that a good thing? On the one hand, the
interest election law has generated among the AALS Federal Courts Section,
law reviews like the Boston University Law Review, and prominent public and
private law scholars, serves as a testament to the intellectual excitement
election law scholars have engendered and reveals the opportunities for cross-
pollination between the law of democracy and other fields. On the other hand,
those who write regularly in the field tend to raise a skeptical eyebrow when
other scholars venture onto their turf and often criticize the latter for failing to
grasp what makes political process claims special. Should we simply dismiss
those raised eyebrows and criticisms as "policing the boundaries," to borrow
Laura Kalman's concept, 14 or should we deem election law unique, a discipline
unto itself?
Consider a handful of examples of election law exceptionalism, where the
Supreme Court has modified constitutional doctrine to reflect the unique
nature of democratic rights and the political process. Richard Pildes and
Frederick Schauer have argued that Arkansas Educational Television
Commission v. Forbes,'5 which rejected a challenge to a state-owned television
station's decision to exclude a congressional candidate from a televised debate
because he was unlikely to win, holds that "the First Amendment requires
unique treatment of candidate debates because... such debates play a special
role in democratic politics.' 6 Another example is Burdick v. Takushi,17 where
the Supreme Court held that a state could forbid protest votes that took the
form of a write-in ballot for Donald Duck to assure a well-run, stable electoral
process. Here again, it is difficult to imagine that an activity with such
2 Pildes, supra note 10.
13 Pamela S. Karlan, Constitutional Law, The Political Process, and the Bondage of
Discipline, 32 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1185, 1187 (1999).
14 Laura Kalman used this concept to describe ongoing disagreements between historians
and legal historians, noting that
[w]e history police have patrolled our turf, guarding our disciplinary borders against
the encroachment of others. Even our attempts at hospitality have been lame. To
borrow from Terrence McDonald, historians have too often reinvented and reinforced
the boundaries between history and other disciplines, even as we have pretended to
speak across them.
Laura Kalman, Border Patrol: Reflections on the Turn to History in Legal Scholarship, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 87, 87-88 (1997) (citation omitted).
15 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
16 Schauer & Pildes, supra note 5, at 1804.
17 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
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obviously expressive dimensions would have been so easily dismissed under
traditional First Amendment doctrine.
We can also identify examples of election law exceptionalism in the context
of equal protection. Ellen Katz, for example, has explained that in Rice v.
Cayetano18 the Supreme Court altered its definition of what represents a racial
classification to take into account the special constitutive values associated
with electoral participation. 19 Furthermore, the Supreme Court's recent Shaw
jurisprudence seems to allow more leeway for race-conscious decisionmaking
in redistricting than it has allowed in other equal protection contexts.
Recognizing that racial considerations inevitably play a role in districting
decisions, the Court has adopted a "predominant factor" rather than a
"motivating factor" test for identifying impermissible racial motive.20
One can similarly find instances where the Court has failed to modify
conventional constitutional doctrines when adjudicating claims about
democratic rights and structures despite calls for it to do so. For instance, Pam
Karlan, Lani Guinier, and others have documented the unique role that groups
play in the political process and argued that group affiliations should be treated
differently in this context than they are under traditional equal protection
doctrine. 21 Additionally, those who write about campaign finance have often
called for a suspension of traditional First Amendment analysis in the context
of electoral regulation.22 Finally, a number of scholars-including Samuel
18 528 U.S. 495 (2000).
'9 Ellen D. Katz, Race and the Right to Vote After Rice v. Cayetano, 99 MICH. L. REV.
491 (2000).
20 See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241 (2001) ("Race must not simply have been
a motivation for the drawing of a majority-minority district... but the predominant factor
motivating the legislature's districting decision." (internal quotation marks & citation
omitted)); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915-16 (1995) (stating that the "plaintiff's
burden is to show ... that race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature's
decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district"); see
also Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is Different, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1201,
1215 (1996) (claiming that "Miller creatively misread the conventional burden-shifting
trigger" in equal protection cases); Karlan, supra note 3, at 688-91 (noting that the Court
modified the traditional trigger for applying strict scrutiny in the Shaw cases).
21 See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114
HARV. L. REV. 1663 (2001) (arguing that vote dilution claims cannot be squeezed into the
conventional individual-rights framework the Court has chosen); Lani Guinier, [Eiracing
Democracy: The Voting Rights Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 109 (1994) (emphasizing the
inadequacy of existing voting rights jurisprudence for handling claims involving racial
groups); Pamela S. Karlan, Our Separatism? Voting Rights as an American Nationalities
Policy, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 83 (arguing for a reconsideration of "voting-rights remedies
to accomodate the claims for representation made by ethnic and racial groups"); Karlan &
Levinson, supra note 20, at 1204-08 (noting that a fundamental distinction between voting
law and equal protection law is that voters are treated as members of groups).
22 See Schauer & Pildes, supra note 5, at 1805-08 & nn.6-8 (cataloguing examples of
academics who have written along these lines).
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Issacharoff, Richard Pildes, and Daniel Ortiz-have urged the Court to think
about the law of democracy in structural rather than rights-based terms.
23
The three articles in this symposium shed additional light on the call for
election law exceptionalism. They all suggest the important connections
between constitutional analysis and the law of democracy. In addition, they
reveal some of the problems that arise when we ignore the differences between
claims about democracy and conventional constitutional analysis.
To begin, these articles suggest some of the benefits that can be derived
from cross-pollination between election law and constitutional law. 24 By
showing the many ways in which the law of democracy is not different, these
articles may help temper any impulse to "police the boundaries" of the
discipline. For example, Pam Karlan, someone who has argued elsewhere that
"voting is different, '25 nonetheless finds that traditional constitutional law
offers a treasure trove of "exit strategies" that might help the Court find its way
out of the political thicket, or at least the brambly part of the underbrush we
call the Shaw doctrine. Her article suggests that the Court often finds itself in
an intellectual dead-end or tied to an unadministrable doctrine in constitutional
law. Karlan's essay thus offers a fascinating counterpoint to the justiciability
debates surrounding Baker v. Carr regarding whether the Court would ever
discern manageable judicial standards in the context of malapportionment. Her
23 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan
Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998) (urging courts to think of
voting claims in structural terms); Daniel R. Ortiz, From Rights to Arrangements, 32 Loy.
L.A. L. REV. 1217, 1218 (1999) (noting that the development of election law scholarship
"has led us away from a largely rights-based, individual-centered view of politics, to a more
pragmatic and structural view of politics as a matter of institutional arrangements"). For a
contribution to the debate over whether it is appropriate for courts to adopt a structural
approach to voting cases, compare Bruce E. Cain, Garrett's Temptation, 85 VA. L. REV.
1589, 1590 (1999) (claiming that a "structural approach would lead courts down a slippery
slope of inappropriate intrusiveness, while locking in a theory of political competition that is
not fundamental to the proper working of a democracy"), with Richard H. Pildes, The
Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1611 (1999) (urging a structural
approach because "[t]he way to sustain the constitutional values of American democracy
is... through... ensuring appropriately competitive interorganizational conditions"). To
be sure, the Supreme Court often employs structural analysis in constitutional law, but we
generally do not see the Court self-consciously adopting an explicitly structural approach
when resolving civil rights claims, which is how most voting-rights claims are typically
cast. See Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or Immunities
Revival Portend the Future-Or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 HARV. L. REV.
110, 159-60, 170-72 (1999) (explaining that the Supreme Court usually eschews structural
analysis when deciding civil rights and equal protection claims).
24 See Karlan, supra note 13, at 1188 ("[I]t would be unfortunate for everyone concerned
if legal regulation of the political process were to hive off completely from constitutional
law and the two bodies were to evolve separately to the point where there is little possibility
of continued cross-fertilization.").
25 Karlan & Levinson, supra note 20, at 1202-03.
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article demonstrates that the quest for manageable standards is not confined to
voting cases, but permeates much of constitutional law.
Similarly, Avi Soifer adeptly argues that Bush v. Gore is best understood as
a continuation of the Court's worst jurisprudential habits. 26 I found his
contribution particularly fascinating because I have recently written that in
Bush v. Gore the Court was "simply reverting to one of its bad habits in voting
cases" and argued that Bush is emblematic of the difficulties courts encounter
in adjudicating claims about democratic rights in particular. 27  Soifer, in
contrast, infers no connection between the nature of voting claims and the
weaknesses of the Supreme Court's opinion in Bush v. Gore. Instead, he
attributes Bush's flaws to the Court's "New Formalism" and its disregard for
"judicial craftsmanship. '28 Though Soifer does not discuss whether the Court
was right to enter the political thicket in Baker, it seems fair to infer that he
might conclude that the weaknesses in the Supreme Court's voting-rights
jurisprudence should be fixed not by withdrawal from the political thicket, but
by getting a better map.
Interestingly enough, the sole article to make an explicit argument for
election law exceptionalism in this symposium, written by Louise Weinberg,
seems equally to reveal the relevance of traditional constitutional analysis to
voting claims. Weinberg ably argues that the real flaw in Bush was the Court's
decision to short-circuit the democratic process and asserts that such a decision
raises a unique set of constitutional concerns. 29 It is hard to discern, however,
precisely why the harm in this case is any different from the injury that would
result whenever the Court fails to adhere to one of the traditional doctrines
cabining its discretion. After all, Weinberg's real quarrel is with the remedy
the Court adopted, its failure to remand the case. 30 That mistake, however,
seems to have little to do with democracy itself; it instead reflects a poor
remedial decision that one could have as easily condemned had the Court
short-circuited some other decisionmaking process. To be sure, had the Court
failed to remand a case to an administrative agency vested with the sole
authority to make the decision or resolved a question that the United States
Congress alone is empowered to answer, we might have invoked a different set
26 Soifer, supra note 4, at 701 (claiming that "the march of [this] increasingly Imperial
Court" has not been "bound by constitutional text, precedent, prudential restraint, or the
votes of the populace").
27 Heather K. Gerken, Old Wine in New Bottles: A Comment on Richard Hasen's and
Richard Briffault's Essays on Bush v. Gore, 54 FLA. L. REV. 407, 408 (2002).
28 Soifer, supra note 4, at 701, 708 (likening what he calls the Court's "New Formalism"
to last century's judicial activism in the name of liberty of contract).
29 See Weinberg, supra note 2, at 627-39 (claiming that by halting the 2000 presidential
election, the Court violated "fundamental constitutional understandings" by displacing the
electorate and deciding the election itself).
30 See id. at 631 (asserting that any offense to the Constitution in Bush v. Gore occurred
as a result of the "administration and remediation" of the case).
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of "general understandings '3 1 than Weinberg deploys. At bottom, however,
our complaint would be the same: in each case, the Court failed to follow basic
remedial principles designed to cabin its power. Weinberg's argument, then,
seems to support Soifer's view that Bush v. Gore is just another example of the
Supreme Court's disregard for what Soifer terms "judicial craftsmanship.
32
Weinberg's article reveals another interesting facet of the controversy
surrounding the Court's entry into the political thicket. Like Karlan, Weinberg
explicitly addresses the Baker debate and offers a spirited defense of judicial
intervention. 33 Interestingly, she does so in part by invoking traditional values
in constitutional analysis such as standing, individual rights, and
justiciability. 34 For instance, she argues that the Court was right to intervene in
Bush v. Gore because "[a] presidential candidate with a certified state election
in his favor is surely an individual with rights and standing to assert them."
35
This is the same strategy the Baker majority adopted to defend against the
dissenters' argument that political rights were nonjusticiable; it cast the claim
as implicating a traditional equal protection harm raised by individuals who
had been concretely injured, thereby fending off arguments that the harm in
question was inherently structural in nature. 36 Weinberg's strategy suggests
that we are most comfortable when voting claims are cast as conventional
constitutional harms.
This possibility returns us to the same puzzle. The Baker debate centered
around the question of election law exceptionalism-whether malapportion-
ment claims are inherently structural or whether they can be cast as
conventional individual harms. 37 Some have argued that the mistake made in
Baker was trying to squeeze an .inherently structural claim into the
conventional, individual-rights approach the Supreme Court was accustomed
to deploying in constitutional cases.38 To the extent one thinks that at least
some voting claims are inherently structural and thus should not be cast in
conventional individual-rights terms, 39 the question is whether the flaw in the
31 Id. at 637-38.
32 Soifer, supra note 4, at 701.
33 Weinberg, supra note 2, at 621-27 (arguing that the judiciary's ability and even duty to
adjudicate election controversies has been well established since Baker v. Carr).
34 Id. at 622-24 (analyzing George Bush's standing, and analogizing his situation to the
one presented to the Court in Marbury v. Madison); see also Heather K. Gerken, The Costs
and Causes of Minimalism: Baker v. Carr and Its Progeny, 80 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming
2002) (arguing that standing and other rights-based doctrine are closely associated with an
individualist approach).
11 See Weinberg, supra note 2, at 622-23.
36 See Gerken, supra note 34.
37 Id.
38 See id.; Michael McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current
Consequences, 24 HARv. J. L. & PuB. POL'Y 103, 103-17 (2000).
" See supra note 23 and accompanying text (cataloguing authors who have made this
argument).
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Court's voting-rights jurisprudence is that it too often casts voting claims in the
terms that dominate its constitutional law jurisprudence, n0 a view that might
lead to calls for election law exceptionalism? Or, as Laurence Tribe has
argued, 41 is the problem that the Court tends to cast all equal protection claims
in conventional individualist terms despite their structural underpinnings, so
election law merely exhibits the problems endemic to constitutional law
generally?
Though these articles underline the importance of constitutional analysis to
questions of democracy, they also reveal some of the dangers involved in
importing constitutional frameworks wholesale into the field of election law.
Consider Soifer's discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in Easley v.
Cromartie,42 the latest iteration of Shaw v. Reno.43 In Easley, the Supreme
Court held that a congressional district's bizarre shape was best explained by a
partisan motive than by a racial one. In doing so, the Court overturned the
lower court in part because it relied on "evidence of voting registration, not
voting behavior," 44 noting that Southern whites who are registered as
Democrats often vote Republican, whereas African-American voters tend to
vote consistently for Democrats. 45 Soifer finds it "startling that the Supreme
Court overturn[ed] the lower court decision based on what [John Hart] Ely
decries as a racial stereotype of its own.
'46
Soifer is correct that in conventional constitutional analysis, basing state
redistricting decisions upon generalizations about group preferences raises
constitutional concerns even when those generalizations are accurate.47 We
40 See Gerken, supra note 34.
41 See Tribe, supra note 23, at 158-72 (explaining that the Court usually eschews
structural analysis for civil rights and equal protection claims).
42 532 U.S. 234 (2001). At oral argument and when originally published in the Supreme
Court Reporter, the name of this case was Hunt v. Cromartie. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 121 S.
Ct. 1452 (2001). Governor Michael F. Easley was subsequently substituted as a party to the
case for former Governor James B. Hunt, Jr. pursuant to the Supreme Court's Rule 35.3.
See Easley, 532 U.S. at 234. For Soifer's discussion of this case, see Soifer, supra note 4, at
723-25.
41 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
44 Easley, 532 U.S. at 244.
41 Id. at 245-47 (analyzing the percentages of white and African-American voters who
vote for Republicans and Democrats, respectively); see also Soifer, supra note 4, at 724-25.
46 Soifer, supra note 4, at 724.
41 Under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, vote dilution claims are governed by an effects-
based standard that requires states to draw majority-minority districts like the one
challenged in Easley only when voting is racially polarized-that is, when whites and racial
minorities in fact prefer different candidates at the polls. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994)
(stating that "[n]o voting qualification.., or procedure shall be imposed.., which results in
a denial or abridgement of the right.., to vote on account of race or color" (emphasis
added)). For further analysis of vote dilution claims and the statutory requirement of racial
polarization, see Gerken, supra note 21, at 1671-74.
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should be cautious, however, about applying conventional constitutional
approaches to racial classifications and intent in the context of voting. That is
because intent is a slippery concept in the context of election law.4 8 What
makes the voting-rights cases distinct is that they take place in the context of
the political process. Because of the way that process works, groups-and the
political structures through which their preferences are aggregated-matter.
An individual's best chance of making her voice heard is by aggregating her
vote with like-minded voters, and people often voluntarily align along racial
lines when casting their votes.49 Any framework that ignores these concerns
misses a significant part of the story.
50
As a result, voting-rights claims often present an unusual paradox for
constitutional law: the best reason for forbidding differential treatment-
differences in voting patterns-is also the best reason for allowing it. What
distinguishes redistricting cases from most traditional equal protection claims
is that differences in group preferences can represent a legitimate basis for
state action. Indeed, one of the main purposes of redistricting is to facilitate
effective vote aggregation by grouping individuals together on the basis of
shared interests, 51 whether individuals self-identify along racial, socio-
economic, or geographic lines.
52
Because of these special attributes of districting, traditional equal protection
rules-which are preoccupied with the use of racial classifications and
intentional efforts to distinguish among individuals-have little purchase in
48 I have made this argument in more detailed form in The Costs and Causes of
Minimalism. See Gerken, supra note 34.
49 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Groups and the Right to Vote, 44 EMORY L.J. 869, 887
(1995) (arguing that under the Court's interpretation of the Voting Rights Act in Thornburg
v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), "the definition of group status was self-generated by the
voting patterns of those claiming statutory protection"); Karlan & Levinson, supra note 20,
at 1217 (arguing that "[in the electoral context . . . race is first and foremost an internal
identification, generated through the political positions taken by members of a discrete,
demographically-identifiable group," and that the "voluntariness of racial and ethnic group
affiliation in the political process requires that these groups be recognized as expressing
legitimate interests"); see generally LANi GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S
CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY (2002)
(proposing that race be understood as a political category that allows for self-identification
and self-definition).
50 For a similar conclusion and a historical analysis of the relevance of groups to the
Fifteenth Amendment, see Vikram D. Amar & Alan Brownstein, The Hybrid Nature of
Political Rights, 50 STAN. L. REv. 915, 923 (1998) (suggesting that "an adequate
constitutional model [of voting and other political rights] must recognize both
[individualistic and group-oriented] aspects of the dual nature of political rights").
1' Gerken, supra note 21, at 1677-79 (exploring these issues in greater depth); see id. at
1677 n.46 (collecting numerous sources).
52 See Karlan & Levinson, supra note 20, at 1216-20 (discussing the ways in which
voters align themselves, and arguing that race represents an appropriate category of political
alignment that may be recognized by the state).
20021
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this context. If the use of a classification is deemed a proxy for intentional
discrimination, many traditional districting values must be jettisoned.
5 3
Further, whenever a state intentionally groups certain voters to facilitate
adequate representation, it necessarily undermines the political power of
another group of voters. For all of these reasons, conventional notions of
"intent" and "racial stereotype" employed elsewhere in constitutional law may
not function as effectively in the context of voting claims. 54
The special nature of democracy claims also raises questions about Louise
Weinberg's effort to draw a clear distinction between "judicial determination
of an election's outcome" and "judicial regulation of the electoral process."
55
In the context of election law, most judgments about what seem like
conventional civil rights claims-that is, equal protection claims about what is
"fair" or "equal"-require a preliminary judgment about how the political
process should be structured.56 A court cannot decide whether someone's vote
is "equal" without having a theory for how votes should be counted and
aggregated. Similarly, a court cannot decide whether an individual is
"equally" able to participate in the democratic process or is "equally"
represented without a theory about what democratic participation or
representation means. When adjudicating many voting claims, then, judges
must make judgments about what political outcome should obtain in a "fair"
political process, whether or not they acknowledge this fact.
It is thus hard to agree with Weinberg's view that courts rarely determine
electoral outcomes unless one defines "electoral outcome" in an extremely
narrow, formalist sense. Consider, for example, judicial efforts to prevent
minority vote dilution where voting is racially polarized. Judges routinely
invalidate at-large schemes that prevent racial minorities from electing a
candidate of choice and force states to draw majority-minority districts to
remedy the problem. Although judges are usually careful to describe these
actions simply as strategies aimed at ensuring a fair "process," the entire effort
53 In the words of two scholars, "If '[a]t the heart of the Constitution's guarantee of equal
protection lies the simple command that the Government must treat citizens as individuals,'
then redistricting stabs at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment every time." Samuel
Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Standing and Misunderstanding in Voting Rights Law, 111
HARV. L. REV. 2276, 2292 (1998) (citation omitted). For further evidence of this claim,
consider the difficulties the Court has encountered in identifying which "communities of
interest" may be recognized in the Shaw line of cases. Compare, e.g., Miller v. Johnson,
515 U.S. 900, 908 (1995) (adopting a narrow view of racial community), with Lawyer v.
Dept. of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 581 (1997) (offering a broader view of racial community).
11 As Pam Karlan has argued elsewhere, however, intent may also be a slippery concept
in some types of constitutional cases. She has analogized affirmative action in higher
education to the districting process and suggested that developments in the Shaw line of
cases shed light on how strict scrutiny ought to be applied to affirmative action claims. See
Karlan, supra note 6.
55 Weinberg, supra note 2, at 620.
56 Gerken, supra note 34.
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is designed to alter electoral outcomes because the outcomes were precisely the
source of the problem. As Judge Leval has candidly admitted, "where
plaintiffs allege that they are unable to elect representatives of their choice,
their complaint ... is that the outcome is unfavorable to them. '57 Thus, Judge
Leval concludes, courts must recognize that, at least in vote-dilution cases,
they are "polic[ing] electoral outcomes."5 8  In short, judges often make
substantive judgments about which outcomes are "fair," whether or not they
frame their decisions in those terms.59 And the practical import of their
decisions is to decide election outcomes. They may not pick the candidate
who ultimately wins, but they dramatically affect who that candidate is likely
to be.
Bush v. Gore strikes me as little different in that respect. Whatever its
practical import, the Supreme Court did not hand down a decision that "George
Bush shall be President." Instead, it invalidated the process of hand-counting
that might have displaced the results of the prior process, under which Bush
was named the winner of the Florida election. While this process-based ruling
about what constituted a "fair" recount surely affected the outcome-after all,
it restored the results of the original process-the same could be said of many
election law decisions. 60 Thus, at least when viewed from the perspective of
57 Goosby v. Town Board of Hempstead, 180 F.3d 476, 502 n.4 (2d Cir. 1999).
58 Id.
59 Further, as I have written elsewhere, these process-based justifications for dilution
doctrine tend to water down or ignore the complex role that groups play within the political
process and offer a fairly anemic view of the democratic process. See Gerken, supra note
21, at 1730-32.
60 Though Weinberg concedes that "[iun regulating elections courts can-and
occasionally do-declare a winner," she asserts that "they do so by counting, not by
refusing to count, votes; by consulting, not displacing, the electorate; by utilizing, not
aborting, the process prescribed for resolving the contest." Weinberg, supra note 2, at 631.
Once we agree to accept the Court's interpretation of Florida law, as Weinberg suggests we
may, id. at 633 ("Let us even assume-although the assumption is unwarranted in this
case-that the Court was right about Florida law."), it is not clear to me why there was "no
valid completed election." Id. at 620. The Court, to be sure, shut down the recount process
in Bush. However, it justified its decision to do so on the grounds that Florida's election
process required a decision, an end to recounting, by the safe harbor date regardless of the
flaws identified in the initial count. I hardly wish to defend the Supreme Court's decision to
resolve this question instead of allowing the Florida Supreme Court to address it explicitly.
As Weinberg demonstrates, the Court was wrong to do so. See id. at 627-635 (identifying
numerous flaws in the Court's decision-making process). Nonetheless, her claim that the
Supreme Court was deciding the election's outcome, which she argues is unconstitutional,
rather than regulating the electoral process, which she deems permissible, boils down to an
assertion that the Court misread Florida law. If this is the case, then, as I have suggested
above, Weinberg may not be sketching out a theory about election law exceptionalism or
demonstrating that a remand was "constitutionally required," id. at 641, but may simply be
taking issue with what Soifer terms the Court's penchant for "overrul[ing] the rules" of legal
reasoning. Soifer, supra note 4, at 702. In other words, Weinberg may be offering a story
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election law, the Court's actions-though legally flawed-do not seem
constitutionally extraordinary.
In sum, the three articles in this symposium offer an interesting and a
diverse set of views on the Supreme Court and its election law jurisprudence.
They reveal the many benefits that can come from increased dialogue between
constitutional scholars and academics who specialize in election law. Each
contribution is important, then, not only for the insights it offers into the
specific legal issues the authors have chosen to address, but because they all
shed light on the ongoing debate about election law exceptionalism.
that could be told in any constitutional context where the Supreme Court ignores basic rules
of constitutional analysis, not just in cases concerning the adjudication of election law
disputes, and it is not clear why we need to invoke "democratic/republican understandings,"
Weinberg, supra note 2, at 621, to make that point.
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